Battle of Stony Point

Battle of Stony Point
Part of the American Revolutionary War

Capture of Stony Point by Wayne
Date July 16, 1779
Location Stony Point, New York
Result American victory
Belligerents
 United States  Great Britain
Commanders and leaders
Anthony Wayne Henry Johnson (POW)
Strength
1,500 750
Casualties and losses
15 killed
83 wounded[1]
20 killed
74 wounded prisoners
472 unwounded prisoners
58 missing[1]

The Battle of Stony Point was a battle of the American Revolutionary War fought on the night of July 15–16, 1779. A select force of Continental Army infantry made a coordinated surprise night attack and stormed a fortified position of the British Army on the Hudson River south of West Point, New York. The position was taken in 25 minutes with the loss to the British of nearly an entire regiment of infantry.

Although the position, commanding a key ferry crossing point of the Hudson, was abandoned three days after its capture, British commanders later in the year concluded that it was defensibly untenable and evacuated it permanently. The crossing was used by the Continental Army in its march to Yorktown, Virginia, two years later.

Contents

Background

Following the surrender of General John Burgoyne after the Battles of Saratoga in October 1777 and the subsequent entry of France into the war as an American ally, British strategy in dealing with the rebellious Americans was forced to change. In the northern states, their strategy was reduced to raids against targets of economic and military importance, and attempts to bring Major General George Washington's Continental Army into a decisive confrontation. Washington, however, deployed his army in strong positions around the principal British base at New York City, and refused to be drawn out of them.

British military plans for 1779 were large in ambition, but were ultimately hampered, in the opinion of their North American commander in chief, Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton, by shortages of manpower, and delays in the arrival of manpower that was promised for the campaign. Clinton sought to force Washington to weaken the Continental Army camp at Middlebrook in northern New Jersey, after which he would march in force out of New York and capture it.[2] This, Clinton believed, would threaten Washington's supply lines, drawing him out of the highlands on the Hudson River into more favorable terrain for a general engagement.[3]

British dispositions

In late May 1779, General Clinton led a force of about 8,000 men up the North (or Hudson) River as the opening move in this strategy.[4] By June 1 British forces had seized and begun fortifying Stony Point on the west side of the river and Verplanck's Point on the east bank.[5] This move effectively closed King's Ferry, a major river crossing at that narrow point in the river, about 10 miles (16 km) south of West Point and 35 miles (56 km) north of New York City.

While he waited for reinforcements to arrive so that he might march on Middlebrook, Clinton dispatched William Tryon and more than 2,000 troops on a raiding expedition in early July against coastal communities in Connecticut, claiming in retrospect that its purpose was to draw Washington's troops further east.[6] Washington refused to send significant numbers of troops to Connecticut's aid, and Clinton reduced the garrison at Stony Point and Verplanck's Point for the operation.[7][8]

Stony Point was garrisoned with elements of the 17th Regiment of Foot under the command of Lt. Col. Henry Johnson. The 17th was reinforced by a grenadier company belonging to one of the two battalions of the 71st Regiment, a company-strength detachment of the Loyal American Regiment, and a detachment of the Royal Artillery manned fifteen field pieces that included five iron and two brass cannon, four mortars and four small howitzers. A Royal Navy gunboat was assigned to protect the river approaches to the fortifications, and the armed sloop Vulture was also anchored in that part of the river.

Washington observed construction of the fortifications through a telescope from atop nearby Buckberg Mountain. Historians also believe he used intelligence gathered from local merchants to get a better idea of the strength of the garrison, the types of watchwords in use, and the placement of sentries – especially on the south side of the point, which could not be seen from Buckberg. During this time he formulated a plan of attack and selected a commander to lead it – Brigadier General Anthony Wayne, commander of the Pennsylvania Line.

The British position at Stony Point was a fortified one, but it was never intended to be a true fort in the 18th century European sense of the word. No stone was used and no walls were constructed. The defenses consisted of earthen fleches (cannon positions) and wooden abatis (felled trees sharpened to a point and placed in earthen embankments). The defenses were situated a rocky elevation approachable only from the west, protected in the front by a watery defile and on both flanks by extensive swampy areas.

American forces and tactics

To storm the position, the Corps of Light Infantry was formed on June 12, 1779, with command assigned to General Wayne. The Corps of Light Infantry was a seasonal combat organization drafted in each of the years between 1777 and 1781 from the light infantry companies of each regiment in Washington's army. The 1779 Corps was organized into a brigade of four regiments, each composed of two battalions of four companies, with the following order of battle:

The plan called for a night attack on the fortifications to be carried out by the 1,350 men of the corps. Each regiment consisted of 300 to 340 men, and the total force included an artillery detachment to man captured British field pieces. According to 18th century military doctrine, this was not enough men to take a well-prepared defensive position, but in addition to the element of surprise, Washington's plan exploited a fatal flaw in the fortifications. The wooden abatis along the southern shore of the point were not extended into the deep water of the Hudson and could be outflanked by attackers along a narrow beach at low tide. The main attack would be along this approach, but Washington advised that if practicable, secondary and diversionary attacks could also be made along the north shore of the point and across the causeway to the center.

Washington gave Wayne his instructions, along with permission to modify the plan as necessary. This was an unusual act for Washington, and indicates the high opinion he had of Wayne's tactical abilities. The assault would be difficult: it would be carried out in the dead of night, called for the men to scale the steep, rocky sides of Stony Point, and required surprise. To accomplish this last element, Washington ordered that the men carry unloaded muskets and attack using only bayonets in order to prevent a musket blast from alerting British sentries. The exception to loaded weaponry were two companies of North Carolina light infantry, which Wayne ordered to cross the causeway, and stage a demonstration attack at the center of the British defenses, where the British expected an attack to come. This battalion, commanded by Maj. Hardy Murfree, was instructed to lay down a "gauling fire" with their weapons as a diversionary tactic.

Wayne selected Butler's 2nd Regiment of approximately 300 men to conduct an assault along the northern shore of the point, while Wayne himself would lead the main column in the south, consisting of the 1st and 3rd Regiments, and Hull's detachment of Massachusetts light infantry. The columns deployed an advance force of 100 and 150 men respectively wielding axes to clear obstacles, with 20 men from each advance force assigned as the forlorn hopes, to protect the force and to be the first to enter the works. Wayne announced that he would give prize bounties to the first men who entered the works, and to anyone else who distinguished himself in the action.

Battle

After a morning muster, on July 15, 1779, the Corps of Light Infantry marched from Sandy Beach north of Fort Montgomery beginning at noon. Any civilians met along the route of march were to be taken into custody to prevent them from warning the British. The column, often forced to march single file over rough terrain and roads hardly more than paths, took a circuitous route west through Queensboro to the west and over Dunderberg Mountain to avoid detection by the British. The Corps began arriving at 8 p.m. at the Springsteel farm, a mile and a half (2 km) west of the fortifications, and by 10 p.m. had been formed in the attack columns. The men were given a rum ration and their orders. They were also given pieces of white paper to pin to their hats in order to help them tell each other from the British in the darkness. The columns then moved out at 11:30 p.m. to their jump-off points, diverging immediately, to begin the assault at midnight.

Bad weather that night aided the Continentals. Cloud cover cut off moonlight and high winds forced the British ships in Haverstraw Bay to leave their posts off Stony Point and move downriver. At midnight, as scheduled, the attack began with the columns crossing the swampy flanks of the point. The southern column unexpectedly found its approach inundated in two to four feet of water and required thirty minutes to wade to the first line of abatis, during which it and Murfree's demonstration force were spotted by British sentries and fired upon. Under fire Wayne's column succeeded in getting inside the British first line of defenses. Wayne himself was struck in the head by a spent musket ball and fell to the ground, leaving Col. Febiger to take over command of Wayne's column. Meanwhile, Butler's column had succeeded in cutting its way through the abatis, sustaining the only loss of life on the American side while doing so. The two columns penetrated the British line almost simultaneously and seized the summit when six companies of the 17th Regiment of Foot took positions opposite the diversionary attack and were cut off.

The first man into the British upper works was Lt. Col. Francois de Fleury, an aristocrat French engineer commanding a battalion of the 1st Regiment. He was followed by Peter Francisco, Lt. Henry Knox, Sgt. William Baker and George Dunlop. As the men entered the British works they called out, "The fort's our own!" – the prearranged watchword to distinguish friend from foe. The action lasted 25 minutes and was over by 1 a.m., and proved to be the major engagement of Washington's army in 1779.

Wayne's losses were 15 killed and 83 wounded.[10] 546 prisoners were taken, 74 of whom were wounded.[1] Some Patriot sources stated that there were 63 British dead [1] but military historian Mark M. Boatner accepts the official British report of 20 killed.[1] However, the report (from Lt-Col. Johnson to Sir Henry Clinton on July 24, 1779) also lists 58 missing separate from killed, wounded, and captured, many of whom may have drowned in the Hudson.[11]

Before dawn, Wayne sent a brief dispatch telling Washington, "The fort and garrison, with Col. Johnson, are ours. The men behaved like men determined to be free." The next day, Washington rode into the works to inspect the battlefield and congratulate the troops. For his exploits, Wayne was awarded a medal by Congress, one of the few issued during the revolution.

Aftermath

Washington's instructions to Wayne had allowed for the possibility of an assault on Verplanck's Point once Stony Point was taken.[12] As part of the attack on Stony Point, Washington had directed two brigades to begin moving toward Verplanck's, and dispatched Colonel Rufus Putnam with a small force to divert the attention of its British garrison. Putnam was able to begin diversionary fire against Verplanck's shortly after the assault on Stony Point began, and he successfully distracted the British until morning.[13]

On the morning of the 16th Wayne's forces turned Stony Point's cannons against Verplanck's, but the fire at long range did no significant damage.[14] The fire was sufficient, however, to prompt the Vulture to cut her anchor and drift downstream.[15] Washington then sent General Robert Howe to lead the two brigades to besiege Verplanck's on the 17th, but the force was not provisioned with adequate artillery or siege equipment, and could do little more than blockade the fort. On the 18th some British troops were landed from ships sent upriver, and more were rumored to be coming overland, so Howe decided to withdraw.[16][17]

Washington had not intended to hold either point, and Stony Point was abandoned by the Americans on July 18, after carrying off the captured cannons and supplies. The British briefly reoccupied the site only to abandon it in October, as General Clinton prepared a major expedition to the southern states.

Some of the captured officers were exchanged immediately after the battle, but the more than 400 prisoners of other ranks were marched off to a prison camp at Easton, Pennsylvania. An unsuccessful attempt by a small number of prisoners on July 17 to overpower their captors resulted in one British sergeant killed and about 20 other ranks wounded.

Contemporary Patriot accounts note that Wayne had given quarter to the garrison of Stony Point despite the alleged treatment of his own men at the "Paoli Massacre" in 1777. (One asserted that King George III fought back tears when he heard of the "mercy" that had been shown to his troops).[18] British reports also remarked that unanticipated clemency was immediately shown the garrison.[19]

Battlefield preservation

The Stony Point State Historic Site preserves the battlefield and has interpretive materials, tours, and demonstrations, primarily during the summer season. A museum on the site features artifacts from the battle, including a howitzer and two mortars. The site was designated a National Historic Landmark 1961, and was listed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1966.

Footnotes

  1. ^ a b c d e Boatner, page 1066
  2. ^ Johnston, pp. 27–32
  3. ^ Johnston, p. 44
  4. ^ Johnston, p. 45
  5. ^ Johnston, pp. 50–51
  6. ^ Johnston, pp. 55–57
  7. ^ Pancake, p. 17
  8. ^ Nelson, p. 171
  9. ^ The Maryland companies included selected members of the Delaware Line.
  10. ^ Boatner, Mark Mayo, Cassell’s Biographical Dictionary of the American War of Independence 1763-1783, Cassell, London, 1966, ISBN 0-304-29296-6, page 1066
  11. ^ Johnston, pp. 127-129
  12. ^ Johnston, p. 157
  13. ^ Johnston, p. 89
  14. ^ Harper's, p. 240
  15. ^ Johnston, p. 87
  16. ^ Rankin, p. 174
  17. ^ Johnston, p. 90
  18. ^ Loprieno, Don, The Enterprise in Contemplation: The Midnight Assault of Stony Point, Heritage Books Inc., 2004, ISBN 0788425749, ISBN 978-0788425745
  19. ^ Johnston, pp. 131,135,138

References

External links